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Networked Enforcement in the Common Fisheries
Policy through Data Sharing: Is There Room Left
for Traditional Accountability Paradigms?
Federica CACCIATORE and Mariolina ELIANTONIO*
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is one of the ever-increasing policy areas that have
witnessed the creation of forms of “networked enforcement”, meaning enforcement
structures in which several national and EU authorities cooperate. Amongst those are a
number of legal requirements and applications for sharing data on fisheries between
national and European competent authorities. This form of networked enforcement casts
some questions as regards the existence of corresponding accountability mechanisms, which
serve to legitimate the enforcement activities in the CFP. The aim of this paper is to examine
the networked enforcement mechanisms arising from the CFP, with a special focus on the
data-sharing activities and the role of European Fisheries Control Agency as pivotal to the
cooperation between national authorities, with a view to assessing the gaps of accountability
arising from them, and analysing the possible alternative ways to provide the enforcement
phase with legitimacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory studies, in their attempt to trace back the factors that are key for effective
regulation, are increasingly casting light on all phases of the regulatory process, from
its inception to norm adoption, evaluation and enforcement. Thus, the importance of
later phases of the decision-making process, such as implementation and enforcement,
for regulatory success has become common knowledge among regulatory scholars,
after a long period in which most studies were focused on how policies are designed,
rather than how they are carried out and enforced.1
In light of these considerations, there has been growing attention to the study of
regulatory enforcement, first in the USA and, more recently, with regard to the EU.
As for the latter, EU law-making and its effectiveness have been under investigation
* Federica Cacciatore, Tuscia University, email: f.cacciatore@unitus.it; Mariolina Eliantonio, Maastricht University,
email: m.eliantonio@maastrichtuniversity.nl. The authors wish to thank Francesco Spera for his research support. This
article is a result of a common undertaking. However, sections II and IV can be directly attributed to Federica
Cacciatore; sections III and V can be directly attributed to Mariolina Eliantonio; finally, section I, “Introduction”
and section VI, “Conclusions”, contain common reflections.
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by scholars and practitioners for the last two decades, since EU law’s manifold
implementation gaps started to be detected.2
This well-known implementation deficit, together with other reasons, pushed for an
evolution and an enlargement of the powers of the EU, which turned from being a
mainly regulatory organisation to one endowed (also) with enforcement powers.3 The
gradual but steady increase of direct enforcement4 competences by the EU has recently
started to be a topic for in-depth analysis. These direct enforcement powers might be
exclusive to the EU or shared with the traditional authorities in charge with them (the
Member States). As for the former case, several agencies5 are being attributed such
surveillance and direct enforcement powers.6 As for the second case, it is possible to
identify shared enforcement competences among a growing number of regulatory
sectors in the EU.
Nonetheless, shared enforcement between Member States and the EU is only one of
the possible evolutions of regulatory enforcement within the EU, pursuing more
effectiveness beyond the traditional distribution of tasks. Beyond formalised new
relationships between Member States and the EU, such as the abovementioned shared
enforcement, we witness a growing trend of collaborative forms of enforcement
between Member States and the EU authorities. These forms of enforcement are not
always structured and operating pursuant (only) to legal norms, nor do they always
involve an active role for traditional EU institutions or for the ad hoc agencies.
These innovative forms of enforcement can be encompassed in the broad definition of
“networked enforcement”, which is considered, to date, the “state of the art in
[enforcement] literature”.7 Networked enforcement, in other words, aims at
overcoming the criticisms brought so far to the previous enforcement models, since it
attempts to allocate each specific task to the most suited actor, according to the
“responsive regulation” strategy.8 It is thereby acknowledged by the mainstream
literature as a way to overcome the so called “governance dilemma”,9 based on the
2 M García Quesada, “The EU as an ‘enforcement patchwork’: the impact of national enforcement for compliance
with EU water law in Spain and Britain” (2014) 2 Journal of Public Policy 331; J Tallberg, “Paths to Compliance:
Enforcement, Management and the European Union” (2002) 56 International Organization 609; J Vervaele,
Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law (The Hague, Kluwer 1999).
3 See, for all, M Scholten et al, “The proliferation of EU enforcement authorities: a new development in law
enforcement in the EU” in M Scholten and M Luchtman (eds), Law Enforcement by EU Authorities. Implications
for Political and Judicial Accountability (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2017) p 1.
4 By direct enforcement, we mean the cases in which the Commission or an ad hoc agency are endowed with direct
inspection or sanction powers against citizens and/or enterprises, that they can exert without involvement of a national
competent authority. See M Scholten, “Mind the Trend! Enforcement of EU law has been moving to ‘Brussels’” (2017)
24 Journal of European Public Policy 1348.
5 Over the last decades many EU agencies have been set up with enforcement powers: see AWonka and BRittberger,
“Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies” (2010) 33
West European Politics 730.
6 See, eg, the ESMA with regard to some specific types of insurance enterprises, which are now under its direct
inspecting and sanctioning powers.
7 J Van der Heijden, “The long, but promising, road from deterrence to networked enforcement” in S Drake and M
Smith (eds),NewDirections in the Effective Enforcement of EU Law and Policy (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2016) p 77.
8 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation. Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford, Oxford
University Press 1992).
9 B Eberlein and AL Newman, “Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental
Networks in the European Union” (2008) 21 Governance 25.



















































































































notion that greater compliance would imply an active role of the EU institutions in
enforcement, whereas Member States are never fine with giving up such powers.
However, the often informal nature of networks, and the existence of a “double
delegation”10 by the Commission, on the one hand, and national authorities, on the
other, raises some doubts about their legitimacy and their level of accountability.
Most contemporary reflections about democratic governance focus on the relevance
of accountability as a normative principle, also in a changing political order such as
the European one.11 Therefore, given that “[a]ccountability processes are supposed to
detect, assess and sanction deviances from authorized mandates”,12 the new trends
observed in enforcement should be tested under such perspectives, and assessed as to
the extent to which such deviances from the traditional model affect (or not) their
capacity to account for what they do. Indeed, there can be many reasons why a
certain EU policy is suited, in the Member States’ view, to being enforced through a
transnational network,13 as the latter may reduce information and transaction costs and
help create mutual trust. Nonetheless, resorting to networked – regulatory or enforcement
– governance might lead to conflicts and make public governance less transparent and
accountable14 or raise further concerns about the EU democratic deficit.15
Against this backdrop, this paper aims at examining the gaps of political and judicial
accountability arising in the system of networked enforcement in the case study of the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). It does so by focusing on one specific activity of
networked enforcement that, due to the very nature of informal cooperation among
the actors involved, could raise some concerns as regards accountability, which is
data sharing. For these purposes, joint inspections, though their role is crucial to
enforce the CFP, will not be considered in detail.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we shed some light on
the concept of networked enforcement. In Section III, we identify and analyse the
networked enforcement mechanisms in the CFP and we explain our choice to focus
on the systems of data sharing in the enforcement of the CFP. Sections IV and V,
respectively, offer an examination of how the system of political and judicial
accountability over CFP networked enforcement activities is organised. Finally, in
Section VI we draw some conclusions about the mechanisms of networked
enforcement within the CFP and about their impact on the overall political and
judicial accountability system, with some hints for further research.
10 D Coen and M Thatcher, “Network governance and multi-level delegation: European networks of regulatory
agencies” (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 49.
11 JP Olsen, “Democratic Accountability and the Changing European Political Order”, ARENA Working Paper
8/2017 (2017).
12 ibid, p 1.
13 J Polak and E Versluis, “The virtues of interdependence and informality: an analysis of the role of transnational
networks in the implementation of EU directives” in Drake and Smith, supra, note 7, p 105; Van der Heijden, supra,
note 7.
14 E Sørensen and J Torfing, “Making governance networks effective and democratic through metagovernance”
(2009) 87 Public Administration 234.
15 T Börzel and K Heard-Lauréote, “Networks in EU Multi-level Governance: Concepts and Contributions” (2009)
29 Journal of Public Policy 135.



















































































































II. THE CONCEPT OF NETWORKED ENFORCEMENT AND ITS MERITS
The strengths of networked enforcement are said to “lie in flexibility and non-centrality: a
variety of enforcement actors, a variety of enforcement strategies and a variety of
enforcement styles are brought together”.16 Administrative networks are therefore
established to fill the gaps between the EU’s policy targets and its limited
administrative capacity.17 What makes a specific type of governance a “network” is
usually its informal nature, although trans-disciplinary literature offers plenty of
definitions for networked governance.18 Whatever task the network is called to
conduct (decisional, regulatory, enforcing and so on), the choice to do it through a
network is therefore due to a functional approach, namely one aimed at helping all
network participants to benefit from sharing their functions with other actors.
Accordingly, the normative basis of networks is often not just the law, but above all
the (shared) culture.19 While in most remaining scholarly fields networked
governance is firstly equated with the specific feature of being composed both by
private and public actors,20 in European studies European Regulatory Networks
(ERNs) are largely known as being networks of members from the EU and the
domestic level, and the private section is not necessary.21 This is even more so with
regard to enforcement networks, which, given the very nature of the task they are set
up for, are necessarily limited to public actors, in charge of a supervisory role and
endowed with inspection and sanctioning powers. In other words, as the regulatory
process moves from a decision-making phase, where an enlarged active community is
healthy to the decision itself, to a later phase, closing access to private parties is
unavoidable.
Yet, networked enforcement differs from shared enforcement, which is also a peculiar
configuration of functions between EU actors and Member States,22 not only insofar as
the former relies (at least also) on cultural rather than on legal bases, but above all because
in ERNs we may find those typical “non-hierarchical forms of co-ordination” by which a
network is identified, “such as the exchange of best practices, and the formulation of
common (yet formally non-binding) standards to guide implementation”.23 As a result
of networks’ non-hierarchical nature, enforcement mechanisms carried out therein are
16 Van der Heijden, supra, note 7, p 102.
17 E Mastenbroek and DS Martinsen, “Filling the gap in the European administrative space: the role of administrative
networks in EU implementation and enforcement” (2018) 25(3) Journal of European Public Policy 422. See also EG
Heidbreder, “Multilevel policy enforcement: innovations in how to administer liberalized global markets” (2015) 93(4)
Public Administration 940.
18 J Kim, “Networks, Network Governance, and Networked Networks” (2006) 11 International Review of Public
Administration 22.
19 ibid. See also WW Powell, “Neither Markets nor Hierarchy” in B Staw and LL Cummings (eds), Research in
Organizational Behavior (Greenwich, JAI Press 1990) p 295.
20 E-H Klijn, “Governance and Governance Networks in Europe” (2008) 10 Public Management Review 505.
21 M Blauberger and B Rittberger, “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks” (2015) 9 Regulation &
Governance 367; D Levi-Faur, “Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: towards a Single European
Regulatory Space” (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy 810; K Van Boetzelaer and S Princen, “The Quest
for Co-ordination in European Regulatory Networks” (2012) 50(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 819.
22 M Scholten and M Luchtman (eds), Law Enforcement by EU Authorities. Implications for Political and Judicial
Accountability (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2017).
23 Van Boetzelaer and Princen, supra, note 21, p 820.



















































































































non-sequential, insofar as they are not formalised within a strict process whereby a report,
for example, is strictly issued prior to a sanction, or data collection necessarily responds to
a specific mandate.
Given these preliminary distinctions, we intentionally do not consider the “shared
enforcement” mechanisms between EU authorities and one or more national
competent authorities, that have already been analysed in previous works.24 We rather
focus on the mechanisms where enforcement is shared in a co-operative, non-
sequential, fashion between Member States and (though not necessarily) EU institutions.
Nevertheless, while we can rely on many studies regarding the role of regulatory
networks, there is much less knowledge on their features and contribution in the
enforcement phase.25 This lack of attention towards the phenomenon of collaborative
and networked enforcement is problematic for several reasons. First of all, it poses a
serious question insofar as the so-called mixed administration of enforcement26 is
increasing in the EU, and it raises a key question over how the governed manage to
control the governors. Moreover, since the enforcement tasks serve public purposes,
but decisions taken target individuals and companies, it is crucial to understand and
assess how transparent both political and judicial accountability mechanisms are for
the authorities involved in the shared enforcement activities.
In light of the above considerations, we try to analyse how networked enforcement
works and whether there are any accountability gaps in one specific policy field, the
fisheries sector. We chose this focus because this sector has been one of the less
studied so far with regard to administrative networks.27 Furthermore, it is of utmost
relevance within the overall EU regulatory scope, for the reasons that will be stressed
below, and it has already proven to be a highly interesting field for investigation as
regards shared enforcement,28 since it experienced direct enforcement powers by both
the Commission and an ad hoc agency. Its potential as a testing ground for
institutional innovations in the enforcement phase is confirmed by the fact that a
relevant number of enforcement networks can be identified within it, as will be
discussed further below. Furthermore, with a view to contributing to a better
understanding of the impact of such new forms of enforcement from a bottom up
approach, able to provide feedback also with regard to the Member States (a largely
underrated viewpoint in scholarly research on EU governance), we also focus on the
National Competent Authorities (NCAs) from Italy and France and the accountability
mechanisms working therein when it comes to the networked enforcement of the
CFP. The two selected cases allow for a comparison of two different legal systems
and political accountability arrangements. At the same time, they show quite similar
implementation attitudes29 and are involved in the same “Mediterranean” Joint
24 F Cacciatore and M Eliantonio, “Fishing in troubled waters? Shared enforcement of the Common Fisheries Policy
and accountability gaps” in Scholten and Luchtman, supra, note 22, p 168.
25 Mastenbroek and Martinsen, supra, note 17.
26 JH Jans et al (eds), Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, 2nd edn, Europa Law Publishing 2015).
27 Mastenbroek and Martinsen, supra, note 17.
28 Cacciatore and Eliantonio, supra, note 24.
29 European Parliament, Monitoring the application of European Union law. 2016 Annual Report (Brussels,
European Commission 2017) p 29.



















































































































Deployment Plan (JDP), as will be clarified below, whichmakes it possible to empirically
investigate their role in some specific networked enforcement mechanisms.
III. NETWORKED ENFORCEMENT OF THE CFP: A TESTING GROUND FOR NEW
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS?
1. Evolution of the CFP
Marine fisheries is one of the most relevant issues in EU policy making. In fact, 23 out of
its 28 Member States have a coastline and almost half of the EU population lives in
maritime regions.30 Furthermore, 3% to 5% of the EU’s GDP comes from the
maritime sector and about 90% of the foreign trade takes place via maritime routes,
and the world’s largest merchant fleet is the European one.31 Fisheries and coastal
policies were therefore needed from the beginning, with a view to curbing
unsustainable fish stocks exploitation and environmental damage, besides
guaranteeing European fishermen a fair and competitive environment.
A CFP was established for the first time in 1983, and further changes and revisions
provided for a growing rate of tasks and competences from Member States to the EU.
Among the first questions covered by the CFP were rules about areas restricted to
fishery, standard fishing gear used, minimum fish sizes and so forth. Also, since 1983
a fish management scheme has been adopted yearly, including the Total Allowable
Catches (TACs) agreed by the Fisheries Council.
Yet, what had soon become clear was that the CFP was scarcely effective,32 and the
Member States were unable to sharply implement and enforce it.33 This led in 2001 to a
first major revision of the CFP,with the adoption by the Commission of aGreen Paper on
the future of the Common Fisheries Policy (COM(2001) 135 final), which proposed a
decentralised enforcement system, where power was to be delegated to the lowest
competent level of governance.34 Council Regulation No 2371/2002 on the
conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the CFP set up
stronger and clearer enforcement powers on the part of the Member States.
A key part in such reform was played by the establishment of the Community
Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) in 2005 – later renamed the European Fisheries
Control Agency (EFCA), a dedicated EU body with the mission to “coordinate
control and inspection by Member States relating to the control and inspection
30 For more information see <ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/facts_and_figures/index_en.htm>,
accessed 11 May 2019.
31 European Union,Maritime affairs and fisheries (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2014).
32 C Johnson, “Fisheries Enforcement in European Community Waters Since 2002-Developments in Non-Flag
Enforcement” (2008) 2 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 249; D Symes, “Reform of the
European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy: Making Fisheries Management Work” (2009) 2 Fisheries Research 99.
33 T Gray and J Hatchard, “The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’s system of governance – rhetoric or
reality?” (2003) 27 Marine Policy 545; J-M DaRocha et al, “The Common Fisheries Policy: An enforcement problem”
(2012) 36 Marine Policy 1309. The CFP has long been accused of “being unable to provide sustainable fisheries”: TJ
Hegland and J Raakjær, “Recovery Plans and the Balancing of Fishing Capacity and Fishing Possibilities: Path
Dependence in the Common Fisheries Policy” in SS Gezelius and J Raakjær (eds), Making Fisheries Management
Work. Implementation of Policies for Sustainable Fishing (New York, Springer 2008) p 131.
34 SQ Eliasen et al, “Decentralising: The implementation of regionalization and co-management under the post-2013
Common Fisheries Policy” (2015) 62 Marine Policy 224.



















































































































obligations of the Community”.35 The Agency adopted its first work programme in
2007,36 and a big step forward was represented in 2009 by the adoption of Council
Regulation No 1224/2009,37 establishing a Community control system for ensuring
compliance with the rules of the CFP. According to the new framework, EFCA is
granted both direct enforcement powers and an enhanced role in fostering
cooperation between Member States with regard to those enforcement activities
upon which they remain competent.
2. Networked enforcement of the CFP
The CFP, as noted, is one of the policy sectors in which the enforcement phase has
experienced significant changes and innovations over time.38 As previously remarked,
the verticalising trend of enforcement39 in this field has led not only to shared
mechanisms between EFCA and the national authorities,40 but also to a networked
distribution of competences, involving also informal horizontal and vertical links
between Member States and the EU authorities to boost enforcement. More specifically,
three main mechanisms of networked enforcement of the CFP may be envisaged.
Networked enforcement mechanisms in the CFP are, first of all, envisaged by the so-
called Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs), which are the main policy tools for EFCA to set
out operational arrangements for efficient and coordinated control and inspection
activities deriving from a Specific Control and Inspection Programme (SCIP). The
adoption of JDPs is envisaged by Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 768/2005.
Through the JDPs, EFCA may provide for common criteria, priorities, benchmarks
and procedures. JDPs are basically built on a network vocation, insofar as their
adoption (following a previous SCIP adopted by the Commission) obliges the
Member States to commit to provide concrete resources for the correct
implementation and enforcement of the CFP principles and methodologies. In this
context, EFCA plays a coordinating role, and to this end it is necessary for the
Member States to notify it of every mean of control and inspection they intend to
deploy.41 EFCA is specifically responsible for: (a) coordinating control and inspection
by Member States; (b) coordinating the deployment of the national means of control
and inspection pooled by the Member States concerned; (c) assisting Member States
35 Council Regulation (EC) 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation
(EEC) 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy [2005] OJ L128/1.
36 CFCA, Community Fisheries Control Agency Work Programme for 2007 (Vigo, Community Fisheries Control
Agency 2007).
37 Council Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the
rules of the common fisheries policy [2009] OJ L343/1.
38 On the CFP’s high percentage of non-compliance, see F González Laxe, “Dysfunctions in common fishing
regulations” (2010) 34 Marine Policy 182. See also M Hadjimichael et al, “Distribution of the burden of fisheries
regulations in Europe: The north/south divide” (2010) 34 Marine Policy 795.
39 Scholten et al, supra, note 3. See also the specific findings from the research team on the verticalisation of
enforcement established within the Renforce group: <renforce.rebo.uu.nl/bouwsteenprojecten/verticalisering-en-
toezichthouders/>.
40 Cacciatore and Eliantonio, supra, note 24.
41 EFCA, Core curriculum for the training of fisheries inspectors & union inspectors - 3 General principles and
specific types of fisheries inspection (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2015).



















































































































in reporting information on fishing and control and inspection activities to itself, the
Commission and concerned third parties. It is clear that JDPs, and the EFCA thereby,
are key for Member States, which are able to pool their control and monitoring
means, both human resources and means, whenever their policy objectives involve
more than one Member State.
Within the JDPs we can identify different networked enforcement mechanisms, the
main two being: (a) the system of joint inspections; and (b) the applications for
sharing and viewing data, offered by EFCA.
The possibility of carrying out joint inspections is foreseen in the context of JDPs, and are
therein regulated, whenever they are deemed appropriate for a more efficient enforcement
of the fisheries policy. Specifically, joint inspections between theMember States concerned
should be carried out according to JDPs’ provisions so as to enhance uniformity of control,
inspection and surveillance practices and to coordinate those activities. This is the case, for
example, with theMediterranean JDP (inwhich Italy and France participate), established in
2014 to implement the SCIP for fisheries exploiting stocks of bluefin tuna in the eastern
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, swordfish in the Mediterranean and stocks of sardine and
anchovy in the northern Adriatic Sea.42
Another set of networked enforcement mechanisms comprises a number of systems
aimed at sharing data on fisheries activities. Indeed, EFCA not only provides for
formalised coordination of the Member States’ enforcement activities, but it also
supplies them with shared databases and systems in order to view, collect, share and
use data on fisheries activities and thus help carrying out inspections and sanctioning
operations in support of the JDP activities. The main system in this respect is the
Fisheries Information System,43 an integrated system composed of the EFCA
electronic reporting system (ERS), the EFCA electronic inspection report (EIR)
system,44 the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and Fishnet, which is a web-based
system providing for a virtual office-like environment designed to support the transfer
of information by various means, such as voice, video conferencing, email and instant
messaging. It also includes tools for collaborative document writing, a calendar and a
mission planner. Of specific interest is the VMS, a satellite-based monitoring system,
which, at regular intervals, provides data to the fisheries authorities as regards the
location, course and speed of vessels. The VMS is set up pursuant to Council
Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009. Specifically, Article 9 provides that all coastal EU
countries should set up mutually compatible systems, in order to allow countries to
share data and the Commission to monitor compliance with the rules. These data,
collected through the VMS and managed by the Commission, allow the monitoring
of the behaviour of fishing vessels in real-time, in particular for control purposes. The
data are mainly managed by the Member States’ Fisheries Monitoring Centres, but in
42 See <www.efca.europa.eu/en/content/mediterranean>. See specifically Art 10 of 2014/156/EU: Commission
Implementing Decision of 19 March 2014 establishing a specific control and inspection programme for fisheries
exploiting stocks of bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, swordfish in the Mediterranean and
for fisheries exploiting stocks of sardine and anchovy in the Northern Adriatic Sea OJ L 85/15.
43 See <www.efca.europa.eu/en/content/efca-fisheries-information-system>.
44 Equipment Identity Register (EIR) helps operators to protect their networks and revenues against the use of stolen
and unauthorised devices.



















































































































specific cases they are provided to the Commission services.45 Finally, in addition to the
systems noted above, EFCA provides Member States with the Electronic Inspection
Report (EIR) Systems Software as Service (SaaS), to use as their own domestic system.
All the abovementioned mechanisms and tools play a key role in the CFP’s broad
mission to promote and facilitate Member State surveillance activities in fisheries. It
is worth noting that, as highlighted in earlier research, no mechanism of networked
enforcement provides for shared sanctioning activities, which remain the competence
of national authorities.46
This paper will further concentrate on the various networked tools and mechanisms for
the exchange of data and/or best practices, which involveMember States and EFCA, and
the European Commission to a lesser extent (eg in the case of the VMS, in which no direct
involvement of the EFCA is envisaged). These networked activities involve, in a
collaborative fashion, the exchange of data and information to increase the efficiency
of the enforcement activities, and to provide Member States with advanced
technologies. This form of networked enforcement is not a unicum in the system of
EU administrative governance. As has been noted, “most forms of procedural
cooperation in implementing EU policies are based on the joint production, gathering
and management of information, and/or exchange of information”.47 The scholarship
that has engaged with the phenomenon of information sharing has considered that the
forms of administrative cooperation in information exchange may vary from an ad
hoc case to a constant and structured flow of information between one or more
administrative authorities. The most advanced form of information management can
be found in shared databases, as is the case in the CFP, where the information is
stored and is accessible to all relevant national and European authorities without the
need to make a prior request for it.48
These exchanges of data and best practices may give rise to problems in terms of
accountability. As accountability has proved to be a relevant issue in CFP with regard
to the shared enforcement activities between the EFCA and Member States,49 this
could also be the case for networked enforcement activities. In the following sections,
we account for an analysis of the relationship between political and judicial
accountability, on the one hand, and the system of networked enforcement within the
CFP with a specific focus on the data sharing activities, on the other hand, in order to
cast some light on possible gaps therein. Accountability is herein understood as a
“relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass
45 See <www.efca.europa.eu/en/content/data-and-systems-fisheries-activities>. See also the Commission’s
dedicated website at <ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control/technologies/vms_en>.
46 Cacciatore and Eliantonio, supra, note 24.
47 HCH Hofmann et al, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press
2011) p 16.
48 J-P Schneider, “Basic Structures of Information Management in the European Administrative Union” (2014) 20
European Public Law 89. See also DU Galetta et al, “Information Exchange in the European Administrative Union: An
Introduction” (2014) 20 European Public Law 68; F Wettner, “The General Law of Procedure of EC Mutual
Administrative Assistance” in O Jansen and B Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), The European Composite Administration
(Antwerp, Intersentia 2011) p 314.
49 Cacciatore and Eliantonio, supra, note 24.



















































































































judgement, and the actor may face consequences”.50 In this respect, indeed, every
interested party might want to find information on how the agent carries out their
enforcement tasks on behalf of the principal, or might want to ask for the judicial
control of such tasks.
IV. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
1. The European level
With specific regard to data exchanged between Member States, the EFCA and the
Commission in the framework of a JDP, whose contents are clearly established by the
Commission in the SCIPs,51 EFCA has reporting obligations to the public, through its
monitoring reports, which are released quarterly, and to the other EU institutions
(Parliament, Council, Commission and Court of Auditors), together with the Member
States, to which it has to forward the annual general report on the Agency’s overall
activity.
For example, in the latest report on the Mediterranean JDP,52 the Agency provides
information regarding the total number of inspections and of (alleged and ascertained)
infringements thereof, distinguished according to the type of violation, and whether
they relate to sea or land operations.
Such accountability mechanisms, however, do not apply to the remaining data
contained in the various databases mentioned above, which are not subject to those
specific reporting obligations pursuant to the JDPs. Hence, if data are shared but do
not necessarily result in a sanction, no accountability at the European level is foreseen.
EFCA also undergoes financial accountability, insofar as its Executive Director must
draw up each year a draft statement of estimates of EFCA’s revenues and expenditures to
have its budget granted by the Commission, based on which the Administrative Board
will further issue a draft statement of estimates, to be forwarded to Commission, which
will in turn forward it to the Parliament and the Council (representing the EU budgetary
authority) in charge of issuing the final budget authorisation. Included in the reported
activities are the overall costs of data monitoring and networks on its annual budget
(database enhancement and development, IT consultancy services and studies,
meetings, mission expenses and associated costs related to the development of data
monitoring systems and networks).53
It can therefore be concluded that, at EU level, data sharing activities carried out in the
enforcement of the CFP are subject to a limited accountability, namely only in as far as
these data are incorporated in monitoring reports prepared periodically by EFCA. A
stronger form of accountability is of a financial nature, which concretises itself in the
50 M Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13 European Law
Journal 450.
51 For the “Mediterranean” JDP, the SCIP was issued by Commission Implementing Decision 2014/156/EU of 14
March 2014, OJ L 85/15. The data to be exchanged are listed in Art 12.
52 Available at <www.efca.europa.eu/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Q3-MED%20web%20report.pdf>.
53 EFCA, AB Decision 17-III-4 of 18/10/2017 Budget and establishment plan of the European Fisheries Control
Agency for year 2018 (Vigo, EFCA 2018) p 7.



















































































































need for EFCA to account, amongst other things, for the expenses incurred in operating
the data sharing applications.
2. The domestic level
Both in Italy and in France, with some slight differences, the NCAs do not seem to have
any specific reporting or information obligation towards the Parliament or any other
national institution with regard to what data they share through the Fisheries
Information System and JDP operations with other concerned national and EU
authorities. In particular, this is specifically so in Italy, where the relevant legislation
(Legislative Decree 4/201254) does not establish any specific obligation for the
authorities concerned55 to report or inform other authorities with regard to the
decisions taken in carrying out their roles of data sharing management. Almost the
same applies to French authorities, since the relevant legislation (a Ministerial
Decision of 30 December 2017)56 does not define any specific duty of reporting for
any of the authorities concerned.57 However, specifically in France, the National
Council of the Sea and Littoral (CNML) – a legal structure comprising members of
Parliament, local authorities as well as societal stakeholders – has a duty to report its
activity to the regional councils each year so as to ensure the coherence of local
maritime policies with the national policy for the sea and coastlines, though this does
not specifically address responsibilities regarding data sharing activities.
Conversely, in both cases, the national competent authorities seemmore accountable in
the financial field, according to the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and
to the requirements therein, to be set out at the national level. The Fund is used to co-
finance projects, along with national funding.58 Each Member State is indeed
allocated a share of the total budget, based on the size of its fishing industry, and has
to draw up an operational programme, which has to be approved by the Commission.
54 Decreto Legislativo 9 gennaio 2012 no 4, Misure per il riassetto della normativa in materia di pesca e acquacoltura,
a norma dell’articolo 28 della legge 4 giugno 2010, n. 96, Official Journal of the Italian Republic, 1 December 2012,
no 26.
55 In Italy, the competent authority in charge of the application of Regulation no 1224/2009 is, pursuant to Legislative
Decree no 4/2012, the Ministry of agriculture, food and forestry, with its Directorate General for Fisheries and
Aquaculture. Control and inspection activities are carried out by the national Harbour masters, through the territorial
partition into maritime districts, under the authority of the Ministry. Other central and local maritime authorities
then support the General commander, which coordinates the activities: the Coast Guard, the Navy and the
Carabinieri, all headed by the Ministry of Defence; the national police, belonging to the Ministry of Interior; the
finance police, headed by the Ministry of Finance; and, finally, the Ministry of Health, as regards veterinary issues.
56 Arrêté du 30 décembre 2017 portant organisation et attributions de la direction des pêches maritimes et de
l’aquaculture, Official Journal of the French Republic, 31 December 2017, no 305.
57 In France, the competent authority in charge of fisheries management is the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, with its
Directorate of Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture. Control and inspection activities are carried out, on the basis of national
and regional plans, by a number of local authorities, depending on their respective area of competence and on the nature of the
controls themselves. The list of the competent authorities, both for administrative and judicial controls, is given in the Rural
andMaritime Fisheries Code. In practice,most of the controls are conducted by the maritime affairs administration, the Navy,
and the national and maritime gendarmerie. See further the consolidated version of the Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code
available at <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071367>.
58 The Fund was established by Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund [2014], OJ L 149/1. See <ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/
emff_en>.



















































































































With reference to both operational programmes 2014–2020,59 the correct implementation
of the CFP (Priority 3) is among the EU-level priorities. To this end, to be eligible for
funding, projects have to be able to implement a complete and usable database,
integrating data from fisheries with those from fish stocks exploited from commercial
purposes. The Fund is to support a precise definition of parameters and
methodologies to comply with the information needs. It also aims at supporting
operational costs linked to supply concerned authorities with men and equipment.
Among the specific targets set out for the Priority 3 is the “improvement of the
collection and management of data”, which is in turn translated into specific
performance indicators.60 It follows that the capacity of both Italian and French
competent authorities to handle data sharing activities is subject to an ex post control
by the upper authority in charge of supervising over the EMFF correct allocation,
respectively the Directorate General for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Italy and the
Directorate of Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture in France, which are in charge of
deciding the share of funding for each action taken within the fisheries.
It follows from the above explanation that no specific political accountability
mechanisms at the information and discussion stage are envisaged in either of the
countries analysed, although in both there is a form of financial accountability
(ex ante and ex post) regarding how the authorities concerned decide to allocate funds
for data sharing activities within the CFP.
V. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
1. Introduction: the duality of jurisdiction
As far as the judicial control of data sharing activities is concerned, the first step is that of
the identification of the competent national courts. To this end, in an information sharing
context, one could isolate the act of providing information or placing it in a database, and
the act of accessing and retrieval of the information from the database and, where
relevant, the act of forwarding the information present in a database by an authority
to another authority. It is likely that these sets of actions, at both national and EU
level, will not be considered to be reviewable.
The starting point of this discussion is, as observed in earlier research, a dissociation
between the authority gathering information and the authority taking a final decision on
the basis of that information.61 In such situations, because of the strict duality of
jurisdiction which informs the system of judicial protection in the European
59 For Italy: Programma operativo del FEAMP, available at <ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/
op-italy_it.pdf>. For France: Programme Operationnel Période 2014-2020, available at <ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/
fisheries/files/docs/body/op-france_fr.pdf>.
60 Respectively: Italian OP, 62; French OP, 107.
61 H Hofmann, and M Tidghi, “Rights and Remedies in Implementation of EU Policies by Multi-Jurisdictional
Networks” (2014) 20 European Public Law 154. See also M Eliantonio, “Judicial Review in an Integrated
Administration: the Case of ‘Composite Procedures’” (2014) 7 Review of European Administrative Law 65 and
specifically on data sharing activities, M Eliantonio, “Information Exchange in European Administrative Law: A
Threat to Effective Judicial Protection?” (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 531.



















































































































integrated administrative space, the judicial level responsible for a claim corresponds to
the administrative level that has carried out the act or action which is being challenged.
For the process of sharing of information which is of relevance to this article, the
duality of jurisdiction implies that the placing of information in one of the databases
would have to be reviewed by the courts of the system to which the national
authority placing the information belongs, while the retrieval of the information by
another authority (which will possibly issue sanctions on the basis of this
information) will be a competence of the corresponding domestic courts. If there is an
act of forwarding of data by EFCA, as seems to be the case in the VMS, this act
would have to be reviewed at EU level. If there is an act of submitting or forwarding
data to or from a shared database by the national authorities, this act would have to
be reviewed at national level.
2. The European level
Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the EU courts may review the legality of acts “other than
recommendations and opinions”. Under the case law developed before the Lisbon Treaty
(and concerning the predecessor of Article 263 TFEU, ie Article 230 EC), the scope of
reviewability of EU measures was extended to “all measures adopted by the institutions,
whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects”.62 Specifically
concerning acts of agencies, Article 263 TFEUprovides that these can be reviewed if they
are “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”.
On this basis, the act of forwarding a piece of information contained in a database by
EFCAwill be consideredmerely as a preparatory procedural step, unable to produce legal
effects on an individual’s legal sphere. An exchange of information from the EU to the
national authorities has indeed been held not to be reviewable by European courts
because it was not considered capable of producing effects on the applicant’s legal
sphere.63
This conclusion, however, does not mean that EFCA’s actions will, under no
circumstances, come under the EU courts’ scrutiny. In the system of remedies created
by Treaties, EU measures can, in principle, be challenged not only directly through
an action for annulment provided under Article 263 TFEU but also indirectly, ie
through a preliminary question of validity pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, by bringing
an action against a national measure and in the national proceedings challenging the
validity of the underlying EU measure. According to the case law of the CJEU, the
range of measures which can be challenged indirectly through a question of validity
is wider than those which are amenable to judicial review in direct actions since it is
held to include “all acts of the institutions without exception”.64 This implies, for the
62 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, para 42.
63 Case C-521/04 P(R) Tillack v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:240. See, however, Joined Cases F-5/05 and F-7/05
Violetti and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:F:2009:39, where a claim against the forwarding of information from
OLAF to the Italian authorities was considered as a reviewable act by the Civil Service Tribunal. The ruling was,
however, overturned on appeal by the General Court on the basis of the IBM case law. Case T-261/09 P [GC]
Commission v Violetti and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2010:215.
64 Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, para 8; Case T-193/04
Tillack v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:292, para 80.



















































































































purposes of this analysis, that the data sharing activity of EFCA could be challenged
indirectly through a preliminary question of validity in national proceedings against a
sanction imposed on an infringer by the NCAs or another enforcement act carried out
by a NCA.65 This conclusion is supported by the Tillack case, in which the applicant
tried to challenge the transfer of information from OLAF to the competent national
authorities at the European level. While the Court of First Instance found that the
transfer itself could not be considered a reviewable act, in response to the suggestion
that this conclusion may deprive the applicant of effective judicial protection, it did
state that the applicant had the opportunity to bring an action before the national
court and ask it to request a preliminary reference ruling from the CJEU.66
3. The domestic level
According to the traditional approach of the French and Italian legal systems, an act can
be challenged in an action for annulment (recours pour excès de pouvoirs in France and
azione di annullamento in Italy) if it has a “decisional” character, meaning that it is
capable of modifying the legal sphere of the applicant.67 For this reason, purely
internal acts and preparatory ones have been generally considered incapable of being
autonomously challenged before the courts.68 This principle finds an exception only if
the preparatory measure is such as to be able to “shape” the decision-making process
in a definitive way.69 Hence, on this basis, a French or Italian court is likely to
consider inadmissible an action for annulment brought against an act of sharing of
data, given that this act is not itself capable of changing the legal sphere of the
applicant, and that subsequent sanctions are only possible but not certain.
As a consequence, the only option left to the applicant is that of challenging the final
(sanctioning) measure on the basis of an alleged irregularity of the data which formed the
basis for the sanction. However, this claim will only lead to the annulment of the measure
if the court with jurisdiction to review its legality agrees to review the alleged
unlawfulness of the data sharing activity. For a national court this implies going
beyond the traditional limits of horizontal separation of jurisdictions and essentially
reviewing the legality of a foreign administrative measure. The matter has been
recently considered by Advocate General Bobek in a case which concerned marketing
authorisations in the field of pharmaceuticals. The Advocate General indeed
considered that “the territorial nature of each of the marketing authorisations and the
65 Although this does not seem to have ever occurred, according to a search for the keyword “EFCA” in the Curia
database.
66 Case T-193/04 Tillack v Commission, para 80.
67 G Pellissier, Recours pour excès de pouvoir: conditions de recevabilité (Encyclopedie Dalloz, Repertoire du
contentieux administratif 2010); V Cerulli Irelli, Lineamenti del diritto amministrativo (Milan, Giuffrè 2009) p 385.
68 For France, see eg Conseil d’Etat, 19 January 2011, no 332635, Mazroui; Conseil d’Etat, 15 Janaury 1997, no
177989 and 180694, Assoc. Radio Sud-Vendée-Pictons; for Italy, see eg Consiglio di Stato, sez. V, 20 August
2015, no 3955; TAR Lecce, Puglia, sez. II, 18 February 2016, no 346.
69 For France, see eg Conseil d’Etat 29 July 1994, no 140976, Assoc. pour la promotion et la défense du cadre de vie à
Bartenheim; for Italy, see eg Consiglio di Stato, sez. IV, 28 March 2012, no 1829.



















































































































necessary correlating territorial nature of judicial review” is likely to create obstacles to
the control of acts or actions originating in another jurisdiction.70
Whether and to what extent national courts would be willing to review the legality of a
preparatory act originating from a different legal system is still an unexplored matter and
one which is difficult to assess in a methodologically sound way. However, this seems to
have happened at least once, when the French Council of State agreed to review a foreign
alert issued in the context of the Schengen Information System.71 However, this may well
have remained an isolated case and it is certainly not a precedent that can provide
sufficient legal certainty as to the reviewability of information provision measures.
Furthermore, even such an innovative approach would only cover the review of
alleged irregularities of information sharing activities stemming from the underlying
EU legislation, and not other irregularities stemming from the violation of, for
example, the national procedural law of the Member State issuing the alert, as these
are aspects which the courts looking at the final measure that is being challenged
would certainly not be willing to review.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis carried out above has revealed that networked enforcement is prevalent in
the CFP, yet the mechanisms of both political and judicial accountability have not been
able to keep up with this novel institutional arrangement.
With regard to the selected mechanism of networked enforcement, that of data sharing,
it has been shown that political accountability of the competent national and EU
authorities is almost missing. Indeed, apart from limited reporting obligations on the
side of EFCA, no political accountability is in place at the national level. This lack of
political accountability seems to be at least partly compensated by forms of financial
accountability.
In both national cases the picture is similar, and financial accountability is somewhat
pushed from above: although it is transposed in the national system of relationships, and
the decisions regarding how it is deployed are taken at a national level, the EMFF is a
European fund and the system of national planning and reporting has been decided by the
EU. Therefore, financial accountability at the national level seems to be promoted from
the EU level.
With regard to judicial accountability, the picture is shaped by the strict duality and
separation between the EU and the various national jurisdictions. This implies that
data-sharing activities, which per definition constitute preparatory steps in the
decision-making process, cannot be autonomously reviewed either at national or
European level. With regard to the EU level, this shortcoming is partly compensated
by the possibility to indirectly challenge the validity of a data-sharing activity through
the preliminary question of validity. In the absence of a “reverse” or “horizontal”
preliminary reference procedure,72 the gap of judicial protection is not filled if the
70 Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-557/16 Astellas Pharma GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2017:957, para 92.
71 Conseil d’Etat, 9 June 1999, no 190384, Forabosco. See also Conseil d’Etat, 23 May 2003, no 237934, Catrina.
72 See further the reflections contained in Eliantonio (2014), supra, note 61, and Eliantonio (2016), supra, note 61.



















































































































preparatory data-sharing action originates from a national authority. In such cases, it
remains an open question whether and to what extent national courts have been and
will be willing to review the legality of an act originating from a different legal system.
These conclusions largely alignwith earlier research concerning shared enforcement in
the field of the CFP.73 As with shared enforcement, networked enforcement also displays
similar gaps in both political and judicial accountability. The ensuing question is how this
scenario can be challenged in the future and how different mechanisms of accountability
can be designed to control these forms of networked enforcement. One pointer emerging
from this analysis is the role which the EU may play in promoting fair institutional
arrangements at the national level, as happens in the financial field.
Furthermore, more future research is needed, mostly comparative, both horizontal (to
examine accountability mechanisms at the national level beyond the case studied
analysed in this paper) and vertical (to examine what happens in other mechanisms of
networked enforcement of the CFP, such as in the case of joint inspections, as well as
in other policy fields, and what lessons can be drawn from them in terms of
networked enforcement) in order to understand whether the evolution of enforcement
governance towards mixed systems will go hand in hand with the evolution of
accountability mechanisms or whether, as seems to be the case, the former has a
faster pace than the latter and a more general re-thinking of the very concept of
accountability is needed.
73 Cacciatore and Eliantonio, supra, note 24.
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